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Abstract
We reconsider Svensson’s inflation-targeting proposal in a model where
the need to raise seigniorage revenues determines the socially optimal
inflation rate and distortionary taxes cause the inflation bias. Interpreting the
targets as contracts, we show that the interaction between fiscal and
monetary policy complicates the structure of the optimal contract. Moreover,
if the commitment technology is imperfect, “highish” targets generate lower
inflation than targets which are too low to be credible. Then we turn to an
interpretation of inflation targets as monetary policy delegation to a non-
distortionary, target-conservative agent. In our model target-conservative
bankers are public-expenditure conservative. Expenditure-conservatism may
explain why central bank independence is orthogonal to output variability.
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Following the seminal work of Barro and Gordon (1983), a number of proposals have
been put forward to correct the inflation bias. Some are inherently sub-optimal, in the
sense that lower inflation may be attained only if distortionary stabilisation policies are
implemented. Policy delegation to a weight-conservative central banker à la Rogoff-
Lohmann
1 is the classical example. The inflation bias is reduced and output variability
increases to the extent that the central bank is more inflation-averse than society and
institutional arrangements preserve the bank independence. More recently, advocates of
the principal-agent approach (Walsh, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1993) claimed that the
trade-off between credibility and flexibility is probably overstated. By means of a
relatively simple performance-based contract, society can entirely remove the inflation
bias and yet avoid distortionary responses to shocks. Instead of relying on the banker’s
specific and “perverse” attitude towards inflation, society itself can provide the right
incentives for the banker to generate low inflation. The contractualist approach has
renewed interest in the issue, and has been subject to sharp criticisms as well. McCallum
(1995) argued that if the lack of commitment technology causes the inflation bias,
performance-based contracts are simply going to relocate the time-inconsistency problem
at a different level, i.e. the contract credibility – or lack of it. In fact, ex-post contract
enforcement cannot be taken for granted if the bank and the government share the same
views on the output-inflation trade-off and both regard equilibrium output as inefficiently
low. As pointed out in Waller (1995), contracts may raise policy credibility relative to
simple announcements only to the extent that renegotiation costs are sufficiently high.
If the pioneering work of Walsh set the stage for the contractualist research
agenda, Svensson’s inflation targets (Svensson, 1997) bridged the gap with the reality of
                                               
1 See Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992).monetary policy-making. After all, performance-based contracts are seldom observed in
practice, while in several countries central banks have endorsed inflation targets
following the early failure of money supply targets and the difficulties met with nominal
exchange rate pegs. Svensson showed that by an appropriate choice of the target, society
can replicate the outcome which would obtain under an optimal contract. Two
alternative interpretations may be given of this result. If the central banker may be held
accountable, a target is a non-distortionary performance-based contract. Alternatively,
Svensson’s proposal may be interpreted as a suggestion that monetary policy be
delegated to a genuinely target-conservative central banker, that is, a banker who
implements non-distortionary responses to shocks but prefers an average inflation rate
lower than the socially optimal one.
This paper explores the implications that either approach bears to the working of
the inflation targets proposal. We follow a three-step strategy. To begin with, we define
the socially optimal inflation rate in a model where distortionary taxes and seigniorage
revenues are needed to finance public expenditure, which fall short of the socially optimal
level, as in Alesina and Tabellini (1987). Then we derive the inflation bias, which arises
as a consequence of discretionary monetary policies when the supply function is
adversely affected by tax distortions and labour market imperfections. Finally, we focus
on the two alternative interpretations of the inflation targeting proposal, assuming that
the government and the central bank independently set their policy instruments,
respectively the tax and the inflation rate. We show that the optimal contract is
substantially different from the one discussed in Svensson: either the inflation target is
implausibly negative or a linear penalty in inflation must be added to the contract
2.
Moreover, if the commitment technology is imperfect, i.e. if the cost of reneging on the
                                               
2 For a criticism of negative inflation targets see De Grauwe (1996).assigned target is “too small”, any target so low to generate an ex-post loss in excess of
the renegotiation cost will be renegotiated . It follows that under these circumstances
only “highish” inflation targets are credible. To make an impact on inflation
expectations, imperfectly credible targets must be inversely related to renegotiation
costs. We present a new perspective also on the alternative view, which regards the
inflation target proposal as a form of delegation to a target-conservative banker. In this
case the task of credibility-building should be easier. Since the banker has no incentive to
ex-post collude with the government, all we need are sufficient legal guarantees of the
bank independence. But why should a central banker be target-conservative? In our
model a target-conservative banker à la Svensson is an expenditure-conservative banker,
that is, an agent or an institution whose public expenditure target falls short of the
socially optimal one. This has interesting implications. The public choice school argues
that political incentives lead governments to inefficiently raise expenditure in favour of
pressure groups. If this is the case, independent bankers, being unelected, are not
affected by interest groups and thus would be inherently expenditure-conservative.
Hence, their expenditure (and not weight) conservatism may explain why central bank
independence lowers inflation without raising output variability (Alesina and Summers,
1993).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the basics of the
Svensson proposal. In section 2 we present a model of the socially optimal inflation rate
following a typical public finance approach. In section 3 we define the optimal contract.
In section 4 we discuss the credibility issue. Section 5 shows that non-distortionary,
target-conservative bankers are expenditure-conservative agents. Section 6 concludes.
1. The simple analytics of inflation targetsConsider an economy described by the following aggregate supply function:
( ) y y
e = - + - p p e ~ (1)
where output  y – expressed in logarithms – depends on inflation surprises ( ) p p -
e ,
a term which captures the distortionary consequences of taxes and labour market
imperfections , ~ y , and a shock e , whose realisations are independently distributed with
zero mean and finite variance se
2. The private sector has rational expectations:
E
e p p = (2)
where E is the expectations operator. Observe that Ey y = -~, that is, expected output
falls short the socially optimal level, assumed to be zero.
Under discretion, the policymaker’s loss function
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 is the well-known inflation bias.
Alternatively, monetary policy can be delegated to a central banker whose loss
function is – by statute – defined as
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,the policymaker can eliminate the inflationary bias –
p p
e = ~  – without suffering any output distortion.
Svensson gives two interpretations of this result. The first is that (6) is
equivalent to a non-distortionary performance-based contract
3 if one assumes that central
banker may be held accountable for achieving the target. Alternatively, Svensson’s
proposal may be interpreted as a suggestion that institutional design techniques allow the
policymaker to establish a central-bank whose preferences genuinely coincide with those
defined in (6). In this case, accountability is no longer an issue. The crux of the matter
obviously lies in whether c
b and p
b  may be treated as independent parameters in the
banker’s loss function, namely whether the central banker’s degree of aversion to
inflation may reflect social preferences whereas her desired inflation rate is lower than
~ p . In what follows we will show that both interpretations are open to criticisms, leading
to the conclusion that inflation targets are either imperfectly credible – i.e. unable to fully
remove the inflation bias – or credible to the extent that a tension arises between the
bank preferred policies and the desiderata of the government – potentially resurrecting
the familiar trade-off between credibility and flexibility.
2. A model of the socially optimal inflation rate
The Svensson’s proposal relies on the assumption that the socially optimal inflation
rate is positive. If the optimal inflation rate were zero, removal of the inflation bias would
require the endorsement of an implausibly negative target. If we interpret the targetingapproach as delegation to a target-conservative agent, a socially optimal zero rate of
inflation would imply that monetary policy should be delegated to a peculiar agent who
sees benefits from systematic deflation!
As a matter of fact there are reasons why society may benefit from a positive equilibrium
inflation rate. The first and foremost is the possibility of raising seigniorage revenues when non-
distortionary taxes are not available (Phelps, 1973; Mankiw, 1987). Alternatively, one might consider
the potential effect of inflation on output through the Tobin-Mundell effect on the real interest rate.
However, the sign of the latter, traditionally expected to be positive, is reversed in plausible models
(Stockman, 1981, Sweeney,1987). Moreover, a new wave of endogenous growth models, supported
by growing empirical evidence, shows that inflation may in fact reduce growth (Gylfason and
Herbertsson, 1996). Thus, we will focus on the seigniorage motive. The determination of the optimal
level of seigniorage and the analysis of stabilisation policies are usually treated as logically distinct
issues
4. We show that the optimal inflation rate is logically connected to the weight attached to the
output-inflation trade-off. To do this, we first determine the optimal level of seignorage and then
turn to the analysis of stabilisation policy. The model presented in Alesina and Tabellini (1987)
provide the ideal framework for our analysis.
Consider an economy where the government provides a certain amount of
public goods, G, to be financed by means of distortionary taxes, t, and seignorage
revenues, assumed equal to inflation, p
5:
G = + t p (9)
Equation (9) approximately holds if money demand, specified according to a quantity
theory, is independent of fiscal policy and G is defined as a fraction of nominal income
6.
                                                                                                                                    
3 The contract would have the following form: w W
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4 See for instance Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Van Der Ploeg (1995) and Svensson (1997).Since taxes are now endogenous to the model, output distortions may be decomposed as
follows:
~ ~ y U = + t (10)
where  ~ U defines the distortions generated by monopolistic trade unions. The
government loss function is
( ) ( ) [ ] L y k G G k
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where  ~ G  defines the government expenditure target. The first step in our analysis is
the determination of the optimal inflation (tax) rate, that is, the rate which would obtain
if the policymaker were able to precommit. The solutions for the expected optimal
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We now turn to the analysis of stabilisation policy when the policymaker retains full
discretion, that is, when he is free to optimise taking expectations as given. The solutions
are:
p p
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5 To simplify the analysis, we follow Alesina and Tabellini (1987) in ruling out the possibility that public expenditure
be financed issuing debt. The implications of debt accumulation are discussed in a companion paper (Lossani, Natale
and Tirelli, 1997).
6 This is shown in Alesina and Tabellini (1987, p.622).
7 At this stage we do not consider the policy responses to shocks. Following Alesina and Tabellini (1987) we compute
p t *, *, * G imposing that p p =
ebefore taking the first order conditions.( )
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Relative to the first best solutions, on average inflation and public expenditure
increase whereas taxes and output distortions fall. The monetary policy response to
shocks has the standard sign. By contrast, taxes and public expenditure are positively
related to e . Adverse supply shocks raise the marginal cost of taxes, thus governments
are less willing to finance expenditures. Equipped with these results, we are able to
analyse the working of the inflation targets regime.
3. Inflation targets as imperfectly credible contracts
Suppose the policymaker adopts a performance-based contract with an explicit
inflation target. The central banker’s loss function becomes:
( ) ( ) [ ] L y w
B = + -
1
2
2 2 c p (14)
where
( ) w W






Thus, equation (14) can be written as:
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where W  ensures that the banker’s participation constraint is satisfied. In this
framework the policymaker and the central bank minimise (11) and (16) by setting the
tax and the inflation rate respectively. Following Alesina and Tabellini (1987), we assume
that fiscal and monetary authorities act non-cooperatively:( )
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the central banker implements non-distortionary policy responses and the socially
optimal rates of inflation, taxes and public expenditure obtain on average. Without a
linear penalty in inflation the optimal inflation rate could be achieved only by assigning
the central bank a negative inflation target! Unlike in Svensson’s model, this result holds
as the inflation rate is determined simultaneously with taxes and output distortions.
Within this framework, setting a non-negative inflation target is neither necessary nor
sufficient to reduce inflation expectations, whereas the linear penalty s is necessary and
sufficient if contract enforcement is credible. On the other hand, if we think of highly
visible targets as a coordination device for expectations, the contract defined in (15) may
improve on simpler contracts which only include a linear inflation penalty.
4. Renegotiation costs and contract credibility
Let us now turn to the issue of credibility. Early empirical tests cast doubts on the size
of credibility gains following the adoption of inflation targets. Svensson’s (1993) tests of
inflation target credibility are inconclusive for Canada, reject the credibility hypothesis
for New Zealand in the early days of the new arrangement – but not later on – and again
reject it for Sweden. Almeida and Goodhart (1996) are unable to find a statistically
significant difference between countries which adopted inflation targets and countries
which opted for alternative disinflationary strategies. They conclude that the case forinflation targets is unproven. In the face of the observed imperfect credibility of inflation
targets, Svensson states that: “Nevertheless, if the inflation target is sufficiently low, the
resulting inflation may be lower than it would have been without the target.” (Svensson,
1997). In our view, this argument is misleading, as it postulates that an inflation target –
per se may determine expectations, whereas it is the size of renegotiation
costs that ultimately generates the credibility of the regime. In this section we present a
formal discussion of the issue.
The incentives to ex-post renegotiate the contract are obvious. To the extent
that inflation expectations attach credibility to the target, ex-post both the policymaker
and the banker are made worse off by any monetary stance more “conservative” than the
one which would be implemented under discretion
8. To see it, observe that
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Therefore the contract is credible only if the policymaker’s decision to renegotiate is
costly. Lohmann (1992)
 presents an exhaustive analysis of the link between the size of
renegotiation costs and the credibility of monetary policy delegation schemes, treating
renegotiation costs as a control variable for the policymaker together with the bank
degree of weight-conservatism. In her model this assumption is justified because the
banker’s conservatism generates a conflict of interests in the conduct of monetary policy.
Hence central bank independence can be graduated – as in fact it is number of countries
(Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991) – to obtain the optimal combination of
commitment and flexibility. In the contractualist framework the bank and the
                                               
8 Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996) identify other reasons to support the view that Walsh contracts are not renegotiation-
proof. The first is that the distortionary taxes needed to finance the bank generate adverse selection problems. The
second is moral hazard and arises when the bank is risk-averse.policymaker hold identical views on the benefits from ex-post surprises. Thus, legal
arrangements aiming to preserve the bank independence cannot prevent collusive
behaviour, unless either the bank or the government, or both, incur some other cost in
reneging on the contract. Such cost may in fact be linked to reputational factors and
“ego-rents” if inflation targets provide a highly visible benchmark to assess the
consistency of the policy stance (Persson and Tabellini, 1993). Cukierman (1992)
emphasises the role of policy announcement, showing that institutional adherence to
precision in monetary announcements exerts a moderating influence on monetary
activism. This may explain why countries which recently endorsed monetary targets also
attempted to increase the transparency of monetary policy decisions. For instance, in
New Zealand the Reserve Bank Act creates an institutional environment which compels
the bank to publicly state in advance its intended policy action, and to motivate
subsequent revisions. Similar procedures have been followed in the UK (Haldane, 1995).
Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1994) redefine the time-inconsistency issue in terms of a signal-
extraction problem for the private sector, who is unable to observe shocks and to
correctly interpret the monetary stance. They show that Walsh contracts may greatly
alleviate such informative inefficiencies by making monetary policy more open and
accountable. As a result, reputational equilibria may be sustained at least for a non-
negligible time-span. However, their conclusion is open to standard criticisms concerning
the difficulties with models based on reputation building, that is, the requirement of long
horizons and the possibility of multiple equilibria (Persson and Tabellini, 1990). All in all,
although Walsh contracts probably increase the cost of monetary surprises, it seems
unlikely that institutional design is able to raise renegotiation costs at will. Indeed, if
simple policy announcements provided an adequate commitment technology, timeinconsistency would hardly be an issue in monetary policy games
9. Therefore we posit
that the policymaker’s decision to renegotiate the contract entails an exogenous cost,
c>0.
We assume the following sequence of events:
the contract               wage setters         e  hits                    the contract      p  is
is determined         form expectations     the economy      is “reconsidered  selected
Under these circumstances a policymaker would stick to his commitment only if
( ) ( ) L L c
G e b G G e p e p p s p e p , , , , - £ (20)
This sets a lower bound on the inflation target and the penalty that the policymaker
can credibly assign to the central banker. It is easy to see that (20) holds in the form of
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b = = *; * is feasible and able to remove entirely the inflation bias.
Otherwise the best feasible contract is
                                               
9 Jensen (1996) correctly points out that if the government could choose the costs of her actions delegations would not
be necessary.p s p












This proves the fallacy in Svensson’s argument that by suitably lowering the target the
policymaker can compensate for the apparent lack of credibility. In fact, it is only when
an adequate commitment technology is available that sufficiently low targets may be
credibly implemented!
One could argue that the lack of commitment technology could be offset by
assigning the inflation target  $ P to a weight-conservative central banker. Consider the
reaction functions in Fig.1. Let p p
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The above conclusion is probably biased against the weight-conservative
approach. As pointed out in Waller (1995), the tension between the conservative bankerand the government wipes out the scope for collusive behaviour. Thus it should be
possible to increase the credibility of a weight-conservative central banker by setting an
appropriate system of checks and balances and the procedures for resolving conflicts
between the two institutions, as discussed for instance in Lohmann (1994). However,
output distortions would unambiguously remain. From this point of view, the alternative
interpretation of the Svensson’s proposal has the merit of raising an important point: to
escape from the commitment versus flexibility dilemma, society should be able to find a
target-conservative banker which is not weight-conservative. In the next section we will
explore the issue.
5. The foundations of target-conservative preferences
Appointing a central banker who on average implements the socially optimal inflation
rate without imposing distortionary responses to shocks is in principle possible. Suppose
that monetary policy is delegated to a central banker whose loss function is characterised
as follows.
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We assume that the government and the central bank – having observed expectations
– play non-cooperatively. The policymaker minimises (11) with respect to t , taking p
as given, and the central banker does just the opposite in order to minimise (25). The
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expected inflation, taxes and public expenditure correspond to the socially optimal
levels. This interpretation of the Svensson proposal does not necessarily involve the
announcement of inflation targets which are systematically missed. In fact, achieving the
socially optimal inflation rate without imposing distortionary responses need not involve
any explicit inflation target
10. On the other hand, G.1 provides firmer ground to the
criticism that inflation targets may not entirely remove the inflation bias if the optimal
inflation rate is too small relative to actual average inflation. In our framework this
happens when labour market imperfections are “large” and the costs of missing the
public expenditure target, k1, are “small”. In this case the central banker should aim for a
negative expenditure level!
However, an expenditure-conservative banker is beneficial only to the extent
that public expenditure is a sufficiently flexible instrument. For instance, consider the
polar case where the amount of expenditure to be financed in each period is exogenous:
G G = ~ (28)
Under these circumstances, the loss functions (11) and (25) become
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10 This may perhaps explain the Bundesbank paradox. In fact, according to Bernanke and Mihov (1996), the German
central bank de facto behaves like an “inflation targeter”, implementing flexible responses to shocks, but never
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In this case lowering expected inflation without suffering output distortions would
prove to be impossible.
As it stands, the model does not provide any insight on how to select an
expenditure-conservative central banker. The weight-conservative banker à la Rogoff
was easily labelled as a member of the financial community, whose sectoral interests are
clearly identifiable on the grounds of economic theory (Posen, 1993). In our case the
task of selecting the banker’s preferences is more complex as the constraints on the
banker’s preferences are tighter. Expenditure-conservatism must obviously originate
from an idiosyncratic view about the benefits from public expenditure. Lindbeck (1985)
identifies three main forces which determine the level of public transfers: efficiency-
driven motivations, “welfare altruism” and the ability of pressure groups to influence
political decisions. It seems natural to rule out the first motivation, as it is difficult to
explain why an agent should be opposed to the provision of public goods. Turning to the
second one, partisan models suggest that expenditure-conservatism is usually correlated
with stronger aversion to inflation. Hibbs (1987) and Tabellini and La Via (1989)
document partisan influences in the US budget deficit, just as Alesina (1988) and Alesina
and Roubini (1992) argue that left-wing parties are less inflation-averse than their
ideological rivals. It seems therefore unlikely that a partisan expenditure-conservative
banker would be able to deliver the optimal stabilisation policies. We are then left with
the third main component of public transfers. The public choice school (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Musgrave, 1985) posits that – whatever the ideological preferences of theincumbent government – the political decision-making process is biased towards
excessive budget growth, which does not entirely reflect the preferences of the public
11.
In this case an independent central banker should be inherently expenditure-conservative
because, being unelected, she would be free from the interference of interest groups. This
may help to explain why central bank independence is usually associated with lower
inflation, but the corresponding increase in output variability – predicted in the popular
Rogoff model – seems difficult to detect (Alesina and Summers, 1993).
5. Conclusions
This paper raises two points. The first is that inflation, and the inflation bias, have a
fiscal root. The second point concerns the credibility of monetary arrangements. Setting
a contract between the policymaker and the banker may increase the cost of monetary
surprises, but it is unlikely to remove the inflation bias. If credibility requires a genuine
conflict of interests between the banker and her principal, then an expenditure-
conservative agent should be appointed. It is intuitively clear that if inefficiencies in the
political process generate excessive expenditure levels, the establishment of an
independent central bank is a rough-and ready measure to reduce both expenditure and
inflation. Further research should investigate how to select a banker who is expenditure-
conservative and shares society’s preferences on the output-inflation trade-off. Perhaps
even more important, institutional design should aim to relieve the fiscal burden on
monetary policy through a reform of the political process.
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